

Part 2 - The Commanders

Major General Edward M. "Ned" Almond commanded X Corps, not as a part of Eighth Army but directly under General Douglas MacArthur. Almond, as a captain, had commanded a machine gun battalion in France in World War I. During World War II he had been given command of the 92nd Division, an all black unit, because General Marshall thought, as a southerner, he understood blacks and knew how to handle them. It was not a successful or happy experience. Almond's career seemed stuck until, in 1948, he was assigned to the Far Eastern Command where he became MacArthur's chief of staff. MacArthur was sufficiently impressed with him to assign him to command X Corps when it was formed for the Inchon landing.

William Sebald, who was General MacArthur's diplomatic advisor, called Almond "a vitriolic man." Thomas Mainane, staff secretary to the Far Eastern Command, said Almond was impossible. Very snotty. He would call me up and chew me out about [absurdly] small things, like there being no thimbles in the PX. I soon developed a very low opinion of him. He gave Walker a bad time." Another observer had this view: "When it paid to be aggressive, Ned was aggressive. When it paid to be cautious, Ned was aggressive." His corps G-3, John Chiles, commented, "He could precipitate a crisis on a desert island with nobody else around."¹

At Inchon he had been demanding, arrogant, and impatient. He had little concern for conventional tactical doctrine which called for a division to be employed as a unit, closed up and operating as a cohesive group. Almond was inclined to deploy his forces in isolated fragments, to create small regimental or battalion sized task forces and send them off on independent missions beyond mutual support. He wanted quick capture of real estate for psychological or publicity reasons. He antagonized his division and regimental commander by flying or driving around the front and giving orders directly to battalion or even company commanders. Grabbing the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, and sending it off to Chosin before the regimental commander was even aware of it was a good example. Almond was courageous, even reckless, and expected everybody else to be. But this attitude was interpreted by many subordinate commanders as a callous indifference to casualties and the welfare of the men.

General Almond's inability to identify himself with the men of his command and their perilous situation is illustrated by an incident that occurred one morning after the Chinese attack when he flew into Hagaru-ri to confer with General Smith. Feeling the need to chat up the troops and make himself agreeable he approached two Marines in their foxhole.

"Well men, and how are you today? Pretty cold isn't it." The two, half frozen, grimy, and bearded, peered up at him blankly. "Do you know I wear a plate?" Almond continued oblivious to the condition of the men, "When I got up this morning, there was a film of ice on the glass by my bed."

"That's too fucking bad, General," said one of the men who could not dare to dream of ever seeing a bed again, whose only wish at the time was for another sunrise. Almond smiled and strolled on, still oblivious of the impression he had made. The story was related by his senior aide, Major Jonathon F. Ladd, to Max Hastings.² Almond's other aide, Al Haig had a lifelong respect for Almond.

Major General David Barr, commanding the 7th Infantry Division, was a talented staff officer but not a strong combat commander. In France in 1918 he had won a Silver Star for heroism serving with the 1st Division. His highest peacetime command was as a company commander. During World War II he served in a series of senior staff jobs ending up as chief of staff of the 6th Army Group under

General Jacob Devers. After the war he served for two years as military advisor to Chiang Kai-shek during the Communist offensive and eventual defeat of the Nationalist. His G-3, John W. Paddock, said, "I admired and respected General Barr, although he was not what I would term a combat officer or troop commander type...He was courtly, kind, friendly, very intelligent, capable and, I think, aware of his shortcomings." His aide Charles E. Davis remembers: "He didn't look or act the part of a commanding general. He was rumped and round, a super guy, but more like a father figure. He was not the best leader or field general."³

Almond was plainly not pleased with Barr's performance. Barr and the 7th Division members were pressed to excel in northeast Korea. They were reluctant to object to or even question any order issued by Almond or X Corps headquarters. They responded to all unquestionably and with "can do spirit."⁴

Not so with Major General Oliver P. Smith commanding the 1st Marine Division. Smith had plenty of combat experience, commanding a regiment at Cape Gloucester, having been assistant division commander at Pelilu, and having been deputy chief of staff of the 10th Army at Okinawa. Concerned about the exposure of the 1st Marine Division, at the end of a long and tenuous supply line and away from mutual support, he moved cautiously, making every effort to keep his division closed up. He didn't hesitate to question some corps orders and had a low opinion of Almond's tactical abilities. The result was considerable tension between the two men, tension which undoubtedly played a significant role in the battle to come. For his part Almond, later, complained bitterly about Smith. He said: "General Smith, ever since the beginning of the Inchon landing and the preparation phase, was overly cautious of executing any order that he ever received. While he never refused to obey any order in the final analysis, he many times was over cautious and in that way, delayed the execution of some order... the Chosin Reservoir, is one of them."⁵

That could not be said of Colonel Alan D. MacLean, commanding the 31st Infantry. MacLean had been a tackle on the West Point football team, graduating in 1940. His classmate, and colleague in the 7th Division, Charles Beauchamp described him. "He was a real bull of the woods...a great guy. Don't open the door; just walk through it. He possessed ceaseless energy, a dynamic personality and an uncompromising will to get things done..."⁶

MacLean had no combat experience until he took command of the 31st Infantry during the battle for Seoul. During World War II he had served in the ETO as a staff officer coordinating troop movements. He had arrived in Japan in early 1949 to command the 32nd Infantry Regiment. A year later he turned it over having won high praise from Walker for a fine job of training under difficult circumstances. He then joined the Eighth Army G-3 section. Until taking over the 31st MacLean had served as Walker's personal "eyes and ears" at the fronts. As such he had been a close, and fearless, observer of the war since July 1950.⁷ In the action around the Fusen Reservoir earlier in the month his officers and men had discovered that he liked to be up front when action threatened or was in progress. He was a big robust man forty-three years old at Chosin.⁸

Of the two army infantry battalion commanders at Chosin only LtCol William R. Reilly, commanding the 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, had previous combat experience. When MacLean was killed and Reilly wounded command devolved on LtCol Don Carlos Faith. Faith had never served in an infantry unit of any size until he took command of the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, in Japan in 1949.

Faith was born in 1918. His father retired as a brigadier general. Faith had been turned down for West Point because of a vision problem. He then enlisted in the Army in June, 1941, was commissioned as a second lieutenant and sent to Fort Benning to the Infantry School. He had

not clear. Appleman's account, based apparently on the Curtis Manuscript, says that little was known of the enemy situation or plans for future operations. However, the 5th Marines had much to report. At 0300 that morning an enemy force had attacked a 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, road block in an attempt take a prisoner. Several Chinese were killed attempting drag away two wounded Marines. (The dead Chinese were still there when Faith's battalion occupied those positions on the 27th.) The battalion had then sent a platoon sized patrol, reinforced with two tanks, north as far as Kalchon-ni at the northern tip of the reservoir. The patrol had contact with scattered groups of Chinese, killed five and captured one. And, a 5th Marines patrol had a brisk firefight with about fifteen Chinese in to the vicinity of Pungnyuri just to the east. All of this would certainly have been provided Faith.

That day and the following day refugees moving south gave information to the battalion's assistant intelligence officer that there were Chinese soldiers in the vicinity who had said that they intended to recapture the reservoir area within three to five days. His information was largely discounted.¹¹

The evening of the 25th, while Faith was awaiting arrival of other units, X Corps Operation Order No. 7, for the attack west, was being issued. The 1st Marine Division was directed to attack at 0800 on the 27th, seize Mupyong-ni, 65 miles distant across the mountains, then advance to the Yalu River and destroy the enemy in zone. The 7th Division was directed to attack north from the Chosin Reservoir, advance to the Yalu River, destroy enemy in zone, and secure the Pungsan area, coordinating operations with I ROK Corps. I ROK Corps, advancing northeast toward Chongjin was to continue the attack. All units were given a series of admonitions including: (1) All echelons of command exert utmost energy to surmount weather and terrain conditions. (2) Employ air and artillery support to maximum along axes of advance. (3) Rigidly enforce necessary measures to conserve food and fuel supplies (4) Exploit to the maximum the superior capabilities of our troops and equipment.¹²

The 7th Infantry Division's operation order assigned the mission of attacking north from Chosin to RCT 31, directing it to attack in zone seize Changjin [Town] and advance to the Yalu River in zone.¹³ The X Corps command report for the Chosin Reservoir states that General Almond, in planning for the attack west, directed that an RCT of the 7th Division be assigned the mission of seizing Changjin in order to protect the right flank of the 1st Marine Division. Neither the X Corps order nor the 7th Division order mention flank protection. The same report states that it was considered that the two objectives, Changjin and Mupyong-ni, were too widely separated by impassable terrain to be placed under control of one division. Initially, the 31st RCT would be 129 road miles and 73 airline miles from the headquarters of its parent division but only eight miles from the headquarters of the 1st Marine Division. Arrangements for logistic support of RCT 31, the responsibility of the 7th Division, are unknown.

The intelligence estimate accompanying X Corps Operation Order 7 was vague concerning forces in the Chosin area. Both the 124th and the 126th CCF Divisions had disengaged, with the 124th possibly sidestepping the southwest and the 126th withdrawing north to take up defensive positions. The estimate did note the reported appearance of the 89th Division but placed no significance on it. The most probable capability listed was delay with two divisions creating a stalemate. Other capabilities were improving defensive capability by reinforcement with additional divisions of the army of which the 89 CCF Division was a part, and limited objective attacks against the MSR. It concluded with the, by now, obligatory warning about potential reinforcement with forces from Manchuria.¹⁴

On the 25th the corps periodic intelligence report was a little less optimistic. The most probable capability was to defend in current positions, generally along the line Changjin-Yudam-Sachang-ni. The report cited various bits of information and warned "...All of this evidence tends to substantiate

the statements of civilians, refugees, PWs, deserters and other sources that strong reinforcements, including large numbers of CCF, have been recently moving into the area between Sachang-ni and Chosin Reservoir. The presence of such forces not only denotes a significant increase in the enemy's capabilities but also implies a direct threat against X Corps west flank." ¹⁵ Most of this more recent information, and other information to come, did not filter down to units scurrying to take positions for the attack.

The estimate by the 1st Marine Division was not significantly different. But, on the 26th, information, which turned out to be of overwhelming significance, was developed. The 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, patrolling to the southwest of Yudam-ni, apprehended three deserters from the 60th CCF Division, 20th Army. They had crossed the river at Manpojin on 11 November and reached Yudam-ni the night of the 20th. The mission of their division was to move south and assume a position from which to launch an attack on the Marines' MSR. The attack was to be launched when two UN regiments had passed to the north of the 20th Army position and was to be launched at night. The 60th had led the other two CCF divisions into Korea. The information of the deserters was partially confirmed by a report from a civilian from the area where the deserters were captured who said that on the night of 23/24 November he had been forced to guide an "immense" number of enemy moving southeast from Yudam-ni. The information had been quickly passed to corps headquarters and was included in the PIR for that day.¹⁶

General Barr ordered his assistant division commander, Brigadier General Henry I. Hodes, known as "Hammering Hank", to Chosin to be his "eyes and ears." Hodes, fifty one years old, had commanded the 112th Infantry Regiment of the 28th Division in heavy fighting from Omaha Beach to the Seigfried Line. He had been wounded twice and earned a Silver Star. Many of the division officers considered him the driving force in the 7th Division.¹⁷ He later rose to four star rank. Hodes had arrived at the 1/32 CP about 1130 on the 26th. He provided Faith with information on the additional units which were to make up the RCT, and said that he expected Col MacLean to arrive shortly. Hodes told Faith the overall situation in X Corps area was vague and that the mission of the 7th Division was uncertain pending news from the west.¹⁸ After listening to General Hodes, Faith said that if he had a tank platoon and artillery support from the Marines he could attack right away before arrival of the additional units. Hodes disapproved the plan and left about 1300. Late that afternoon Faith was provided a copy of the 5th Marines operation order directing their movement to Yudam-ni, and informed by LtCol Murray that he would be departing shortly. Faith asked if he had any instruction for him. Murray told him he had none, but suggested that he proceed no farther north without instructions from the 7th Division.

Faith was left as the commander of the sole unit east of Chosin with no instructions, but not for long. Col MacLean arrived about 1900 with a small command group. MacLean ordered a regimental CP established in a school house at Hudong, about a mile south of Faith's CP. Telephone communication was established with the 1st Marine Division, and through them X Corps, but MacLean was unable to establish communication with the 7th Division headquarters at Pukchong. With communication established MacLean had his S-3 call X Corps and request road priority for movement of the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry and that the battalion's movement be expedited. At corps headquarters the G-3 contacted Lt Col McCormick in the G-4 section. McCormick stated that corps traffic control would be in effect on the Hamhung - Hagaru MSR effective at 0800 the following morning and that priority commensurate with other movements would be given RCT 31.¹⁹

MacLean also ordered the regimental I&R Platoon to scout up the Pungnyuri River. The platoon departed, apparently early the next afternoon, and was never heard from again. Three survivors of the platoon managed to escape and make it back to the 1/32 perimeter. Months later it was learned that

the rest of the platoon had been ambushed and captured by the Chinese.

Major William R. Lynch Jr., a liaison officer with the 7th Division, had been alerted on the 26th to go to Hagaru-ri to act as General Hodes G-3 assistant. Before leaving Hungnam Lynch attended the morning briefing at X Corps on the 27th. According to Lynch when LtCol Quinn discussed the situation along the X Corps front he made only passing reference to the presence of some Chinese in the 1st Marine Division sector and seemed attach little import it.²⁰

The Attack West Begins

At Yudam-ni the attack went off on time with the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, advancing along the road while the 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines, secured the high ground on either side. The advance met with very heavy resistance, limiting the days advance to 2,000 yards. Company size patrols moving out to the north and to the southwest of Yudam-ni were fiercely resisted. To the Marines it was obvious something new had been added. General Almond drive from Hamhung to the 7th Marines CP at Yudam-ni that morning, was briefed on the situation and awarded three silver stars. He did not visit the 5th Marines CP where he might have obtained more current details on the heavy resistance being met. Almond was also aware of the Chinese counterattack in the Eighth Army zone and the collapse of II ROK Corps. But, at that time, neither he nor the General Walker recognized it as the start of a major Chinese counteroffensive.

At Hagaru-ri the headquarters and two rifle companies of the 3rd Battalion 1st Marines had arrived the evening before to defend the town. The remaining 3/1 units had been left behind at Chigyong for lack of transportation. Advance parties of the 1st Marine Division headquarters were at Hagaru-ri installing communication and preparing to open the command post there, but General Smith was still at Hamhung and would not arrive until the 28th .

East of the reservoir RCT 31 was not prepared to attack. The 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines, had occupied the most advanced position east of the reservoir, a position astride the road about four miles north of the Pungnyri River, a location the Chinese referred to a Neidongjik. Only that morning were they preparing to leave that position to join the rest of their regiment at Yudam-ni. There was only the 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, still on Hill 1221, and a small regimental command group on hand. Other elements of the task force were either still on the road or only then starting to move.

About 1300 Faith, with the approval of Colonel MacLean, began moving his battalion forward to the vacated positions of 3/5. The battalion executive officer, Major Miller, thought the battalion was "extended beyond capabilities" in occupying the same holes and bunkers as the Marines, calling it "thinly spread."²¹ The battalion S-3, on the other hand said, "...by Army standards this Marine battalion occupied a very small goose egg."²² The battalion moved by shuttling troops with its organic vehicles. By 1530 all elements had been moved forward except for the rear supply dumps.

Pfc Jay Ransone of A Company was part of a reconnaissance patrol from I/32 dispatched north with three others, two of whom were KATUSAs. The patrol encountered three Korean civilians, one of them was a man in his twenties. He had a story which seemed to excite the two KATUSAs. Unable to communicate with the Korean the patrol took the young civilian back to the company. An interpreter was called to question the Korean. He said there were tens of thousands of Chinese soldiers in the hills around the Chosin Reservoir. Ransone said his company officers did not seem impressed.²³

Additional task force units began arriving during the day. Col MacLean and LtCol Ray O. Embree, the artillery battalion commander who had arrived the night before, reconnoitered the area and

decided to place the artillery batteries at Sinhung-ni, later called the "Inlet", a reasonably level space just south of the point where the Pungnyuri River empties into the Chosin Reservoir. The 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, would deploy in the same area.

The artillery headquarters had gone into position in a draw on the west slope of Hill 1456, south of the Inlet, and had been joined there by D Battery of the 15th AAA - AW Battalion, less one platoon. At least one of the artillery officer considered the artillery to be in a "non-tactical" bivouac. There was no communication between the batteries and the battalion headquarters and, in B Battery, all firing was under battery control, most of it direct fire.²⁴ A Battery, apparently arriving late in the day, did not dig in the trails of their guns or lay wire from the guns to the battery.²⁵

In the afternoon Captain Robert E. Drake arrived at Hudong with the tank company. Leaving the tanks at Hudong Drake drove forward looking for Col MacLean without success, but he did talk to Faith. Even though he was expecting to attack north the following morning Faith said he saw no reason to bring the tanks forward that evening.²⁶

By nightfall all units of the task force had arrived except the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry, and the medical company. The regimental heavy mortar company, less one platoon, had taken up positions about halfway between 1/32 and the inlet, enabling the company to support both. The 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, deployed with companies K and I along a ridge line facing to the east. The location of the third company, "L", is undetermined but is believed to have been in an assembly area near the bridge leading into the Inlet from the north. Staff Sergeant Harry Scott, a radio repairman in headquarters company, thought the battalion was not well deployed. "We got in after dark. A hasty guard was set. Supposedly, the road was clear to the Yalu, so it was a sloppy guard. We paid for our poor guard discipline."²⁷

Col MacLean had directed that a forward CP be established near the position of the heavy mortar company. About dark MacLean decided take a small command group and move forward to spend the night at this CP. An operation order had been prepared for advance the next morning. MacLean stopped at 3/31 for a talk with Reilly. Reilly requested permission pass through 1/32 and continue the advance the next day. MacLean disapproved the suggestion and informed Reilly that the regiment would not attack in the morning, but would patrol to the north and east while waiting the arrival of the remaining battalion. Apparently the decision not to attack the next morning was not relayed to Faith who assembled his company commanders about 2030 to receive the battalion attack order. At the rear CP the S-3, LtCol Anderson, sent a situation report to corps stating the task force had "seized" Sinhung-ni and Neidongjik, planned to seize CV530880 (Hill mass 1247, about two and one-half miles north of the 1/32 position) as a patrol base on 28 November and patrol to Kalchon-ni and Pungnyuri.²⁸

At the end of the first day the task force was disposed in seven different locations spread out from north south over a distance of ten miles with one key terrain feature, Hill 1221, separating the two forward battalions and the artillery from the regimental command post. The remaining battalion of the task force, the 2nd Battalion, 31st Infantry, had departed Pukchong that morning, the troops by train, the organic vehicles by road. On arrival in Hamhung the battalion commander, LtCol Reidy, reported to X Corps headquarters. He was instructed keep his battalion in Hamhung until further orders.²⁹ The corps G-3 Journal indicates that the battalion was considered be in corps reserve.³⁰

As darkness closed around the task force the 7th Division soldiers had to cope with one unusual problem, the KATUSAs, Korean Augmentation Troops, U. S. Army. Early in the war the army units initially committed drew heavily upon the 7th Division for replacements. The division had been filled

up with young Koreans, press-ganged off the streets and given minimal training. Each of the infantry companies had approximately fifty KATUSAs. There were serious problems of language and training in trying to integrate the KATUSAs. Mortrude mentioned some of the problems. The cold seemed to make them dis-spirited and resigned. They displayed frequent "ostrich" behavior. If there were two KATUSAs sharing a foxhole there was a strong possibility no one would be alert. For that reason U. S. troops did not trust the KATUSAs to share a foxhole.

The Chinese Plan of Attack

The Chinese had assembled twelve divisions of the 9th CCF Army Group in Northeast Korea. The evidence indicates the Chinese originally had hoped to wait until X Corps units had advanced farther north. X Corps change in direction required the Chinese to re-deploy. With delays in getting into position they were not able to get into position to launch their attack at the same time as the offensive opened against the Eighth Army on the 25th. But, by nightfall on the 27th seven Chinese divisions were poised to commence the attack just as the three prisoners of the 60th CCF Division had said. Their objective: Destroy the 1st Marine Division.

The 80th and 81st CCF Divisions of the 27th CCF Army deployed on the east side of the Chosin Reservoir. The 81st CCF Division, less on regiment, was to seize areas on the western side of the Fusen Reservoir which, the Chinese commander believed, would cut lateral communications between the 1st Marine Division and the 7th Infantry Division.³¹ The 80th Division, with one regiment of the 81st attached, was to attack the UNC units on the east side of the reservoir.³² Circumstances and the Chinese accounts seem indicate they expected to be attacking elements of the 1st Marine Division at Neidongjik and the Inlet, and perhaps at Hill 1221 all of which had previously been occupied by Marines. An after action report by the 20th Army stating it took more than two days to receive instructions from higher level unit would seem to confirm this.

In the West

Shortly after dark on the 25th the Chinese launched their major counteroffensive against the Eighth Army. By noon the following day ROK II Corps, on the right flank, between Eighth Army and X Corps had begun to crumble. General Hodes comment that the mission of the 7th Division was uncertain pending news from the west indicates that X Corps and 7th Division were aware of the Chinese action. By evening of the 26th General Walker, the Eighth Army's commander, continued to view the situation on the right flank of the army as a "local problem" which, while growing ever more serious, could still be rectified by proper tactical maneuvers and reinforcements. There was no clear perception that the CCF had struck in such massive strength that the Eighth Army was in imminent danger of encirclement.³³

But by noon of the 27th Walker realized the situation was serious. The Eighth Army deputy chief of staff, reported to Tokyo "Indications are that enemy is no longer on defensive but is taking offensive action in strength. Main effort at the moment is against IX Corps (center) and II ROK Corps on our right. ...the general feeling up there is not pessimistic. But its a tight situation brought about primarily by lack of firmness on the part of our little friends."³⁴

None of this information filtered down to RCT31. The operation order which had been prepared for the next day's attack was blank in paragraph 1a, the place where the enemy information on the enemy situation would normally be.³⁵ As darkness fell on the 27th the truncated regiment, casually disposed, was unaware of the very heavy resistance being met at Yudam-ni, or the counterattacks commencing there about dusk, and had very little information on the enemy situation locally.

1. Blair p 32
2. Hastings, Max *The Korean War*. New York: Touchstone. 1987 p 160
3. Ibid p 275
4. Ibid p 389
5. Interview LtGen Edward M. Almond by Capt. Thomas G. Ferguson 29 Mar 75. Almond Papers. MHI Carlisle.
6. Blair p389 - Quoting interview with Beauchamp
7. Blair p389
8. Appleman *East of Chosin* pp 31-33
9. Smith interview with Benis M. Frank 9, 11, 12 June 1969 - Papers of Lt. Gen. O. P. Smith, Marine Corps Research Center, Quantico Virginia. Smith has been criticized for not providing cold weather clothing for the army battalion since it was attached to him and normally attached units are supposed to be supplied. However, it is also anticipated that any unit attached would come completely equipped to carry out their mission.
10. Mortrude, Lt. James O. "Mortrude Autobiographic Chronology of North Korean Operations" no date. Copy in possession of the author
11. Appleman *East of Chosin* p 30
12. X Corps Operation Order No. 7 24 Nov 50
13. *Command Report - Chosin Reservoir - X Corps* p 9
14. X Corps - Appendix 1 Annex A Operation Order 7, 24 Nov 1950 - Intelligence
15. X Corps PIR 60 25 Nov 50
16. X Corps PIR 61 26 Nov 50
17. Blair p 276
18. Curtis, Wesley J., *Operations of the First battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 7th Inf Div., in the Chosin Reservoir area of Korea during the period 24 November 2 December 1950*. Unpublished manuscript provided courtesy of Col. George Rasula
19. X Corps G-3 Journal 262335 J-13
20. Appleman *East of Chosin* p 41 - quoting letters from Lynch
21. Ibid p 47.

22. Curtis Manuscript
23. Hammel *Chosin* p. 104
24. Ltr Edward L. Magill, B/57FA to Roy Appleman dated 5 June 91
25. "Memories of War" by Robert F. Hammond A/57FA no date
26. Appleman *East of Chosin* p. 40
27. SSgt Harry J. Scott HqCo, 3/31 in Wilson, Arthur and Norm Strickbine. *Korean Vignettes: The Faces of War*. Portland: Artworks Publications, 1996 p 151
28. X Corps G-3 Journal Item J-105 272320 Nov 50
29. 28. *Command Report - Chosin Reservoir* 27 November 1950 - 12 December 1950. 7th Division, "Action of 7th Infantry Division Units at Chosin Reservoir from 24 November 1950 to 12 December 1950." No date
30. X Corps G-3 Journal J26 281120 said the battalion was being released as corps reserve.
31. No lateral contact was ever established between 1st Mar Div units at Hagaru and 7th Infantry Division units on the east side of the Fusen Reservoir because of the distance and difficult terrain. This is an interesting example of the Chinese appraising the situation in light of their own abilities to operate over such difficult terrain.
32. Chinese Academy of Military Science. *The War History of the Chinese People's Volunteers in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea*. Beijing: Military Science Press, 1988 pp 59-64
33. Mossman, Billy C. *Ebb and Flow: November, 1950 - July, 1951*. Washington: Center of Military History, U.S. Army. 1990 p71 and Blair p 449
34. Appleman, Roy E. *Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press., 1989. p 85.
35. Curtis Manuscript